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Criminal Procedure in the Rehnquist Court:
Has the Rehnquisition Begun?
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
INTRODUCTION
The nomination of Justice William Rehnquist for the post of Chief Justice
of the United States has aroused considerable consternation in liberal circles.
Whereas the product of the Burger Court has aptly been termed "the counter-
revolution that wasn't,"' it is feared that Chief Justice Rehnquist may bring
the will, the intellect and, most importantly, the votes to make serious inroads
into the structure of federally enforced constitutional rights that was erected
by the Warren Court.
For example, at Justice Rehnquist's confirmation hearings, Senator Ken-
nedy termed him an "extremist. ' 2 Similarly, Anthony Lewis, editorializing
in the New York Times, strongly criticized the choice of Justice Rehnquist
for Chief Justice. He termed Rehnquist an "activist" who is willing "to
override precedent, [and] to reshape constitutional traditions in radical ways." 3
He foresees "drastic limitation of the Court's role as the protector of
American liberties" and a country "in which our freedoms are less secure,
official power less restrained." He concludes that "the American public will
not be happy with a Supreme Court reconstructed in President Reagan's
image. ' 4
Yet this same Anthony Lewis, in his foreward to The Burger Court: The
Counter-Revolution That Wasn't, was sanguine about the current state of
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. The author is a
former law clerk to Justice Rehnquist (OT 1975). An earlier draft of this Article was the
basis of the author's testimony before and submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Hearings on the Nomination of William Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States
(July 31, 1986). The author expresses his appreciation to Professors Dan Conkle, Bob Heidt
and Joe Hoffman for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
The term "Rehnquisition" first appeared in a Harvard Law School publication in the early
1970's.
1. THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi, ed. 1983)
[hereinafter THE BURGER COURT].
2. Nomination of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the United States: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d sess. (1986) [hereinafter Confirmation
Hearings] (statement of Edward Kennedy, Senator).
3. Lewis, The Court: Rehnquist, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1986, § A, at 15.
4. Id. Similarly, Professor Tribe stated that he "would be extremely surprised if over the
next several years the effect [of the Rehnquist and Scalia appointments] is not to push the
Court to the right considerably." TimE, June 30, 1986, at 25. The New York Times also averred
that "the ideological balance is likely to shift perceptibly to the right if the Senate confirms
President Reagan's selections [for the Supreme Court]". N.Y. Times, June 18, 1986, § A, at
1.
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the law, expressing the view that the Warren Court doctrines "are more
securely rooted now than they were in 1969." In the same book, Professor
Kamisar, commenting on the state of criminal procedure law, similarly
averred that "the intensity of the civil libertarian criticism of the Burger
Court in the police practices area 'relates less to what the Court has done
than to what the critics fear[ed] it [would] do.' "I
This Article will attempt to determine just what Justice Rehnquist's views
on criminal procedure are,6 to consider how those views differ from the
doctrine of the current majority and to assess the chances that, to the extent
that those views differ substantially from current doctrine, they will become
law in the future. It will conclude that, though he is unquestionably the
most conservative member of the Court, that is, the most likely to vote
against a criminal defendant, he cannot be considered an "extremist." There
is a substantial body of cases in which he has voted for defendants and he
has explicitly accepted most of the major Warren Court innovations in this
area (though he has also generally refused to expand them). Even in cases
5. THE BURGER COURT, supra note 1, at 90 (quoting Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger
Court and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1408 (1977)). See also
Saltzburg, The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger
Courts, 69 GEo. L.J. 151 (1980):
The Burger Court has reaffirmed, explicitly or implicitly, nearly all of [the
Warren Court criminal procedure] decisions .... [T]he differences between the
Warren and the Burger decisions tend to be more at the margin than at the heart
of the constitutional principles for which the Warren Court is remembered.
Id. at 153.
6. There are a number of sources to which one may turn for such information. Of greatest
value are published speeches, law review articles and sole dissents, since these will represent
the pure views of their author, undiluted by any need to accommodate the opinions of others
and unfiltered by the mind of a reporter of those views. Nearly as useful is The New York
Times Magazine interview with the Justice, which, while subject to distortion by the reporter,
provides insights into personal philosophy which cannot be found in opinions and speeches.
See infra note 68. Of slightly diminished importance, but still useful, are dissenting and
concurring opinions authored by Justice Rehnquist that are joined by others. In these, one
cannot be totally confident that any given assertion, or reservation, is the pure view of the
author or an accommodation to one of the joiners. Obviously, this reservation is even more
true of majority opinions where the author is more anxious to attract others to join his actual
opinion (as opposed to just voting the same way) than is the author of a dissent. Of least use,
but not totally valueless, particularly where a consistent pattern has developed over the years,
are mere votes to join the majority opinions of others. As I have previously indicated, the
"tyranny of the majority opinion" is such that it cannot confidently be read as expressing any
more than a general preference of the joining Justices, rather than their specific views. Bradley,
The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1, 28 (1986). Nevertheless,
it would be difficult for a Justice who has consistently accepted Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), for example, by joining a series of opinions that endorsed that decision, to suddenly
denounce it. It would be even more difficult for the Justice to attract any supporters to that
denunciation. When a Justice joins a concurring or dissenting opinion, it is more likely to
express his views since writing a separate dissent is a less significant departure than writing
separately from a majority opinion. Since Justice Rehnquist has not hesitated to write separate
dissents, see, e.g., Nat'l L.J., June 30, 1986, at 48-49, when he has joined a dissent or concurring
opinion I have tended, absent contrary evidence, to believe that such opinion does, at least
generally, explicate his views.
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where Justice Rehnquist has been a lone dissenter, his dissent has generally
accepted the core concept of the majority opinion, differing only as to
questions of application. Whether this acceptance is based upon philosophical
agreement, expediency or resignation cannot be discerned from his opinions.
Whatever the basis, his accession to the view of the majority of the Court
and to most of the Warren Court cases suggests that the future of criminal
procedure, even in a Court in which the views of Justice Rehnquist held
greater sway than they do now, would not differ as radically from current
law as his critics suggest.
I. THE BURGER COURT DECISIONS
Professors Israel, Saltzburg and Kamisar have all ably and thoroughly
analyzed the work of the Burger Court in criminal procedure.7 I will not
repeat these efforts, but rather will provide the briefest possible sketch of
developments in the last decade and a half.
In general, these decisions can be seen as a retreat from, rather than a
rout of, the Warren Court decisions. In the search and seizure area, the
exclusionary rule and the (often excepted) warrant requirement were re-
tained.' However, the establishment of probable cause by the police was
made easier 9 and a good faith exception to the warrant requirement was
created. 0 Standing requirements were tightened" and fourth amendment
claims were barred from collateral attack in federal courts.' 2 Consent searches
were made easier.'3 The scope of warrantless automobile searches' 4 and
searches incident to arrest' 5 (including automobile searches incident to ar-
rest)' 6 was greatly expanded.
While the Court's major search decisions have been essentially uniform
in favoring the police,' 7 the Court has taken a greater interest in the rights
of defendants in cases involving seizure of the person. While in United States
v. Watson" the Court did hold that warrantless arrests of felony suspects
7. See supra note 5.
8. For an analysis of the problems with the warrant requirement and its many exceptions,
see Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1468 (1985).
9. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
10. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
11. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Only a person with a "legitimate expectation of
privacy" in a particular premise has standing to raise a fourth amendment claim. Id. at 148.
12. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
13. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
14. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
15. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
16. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
17. One exception was Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), in which the Court rejected
the state's rule that under no circumstances may the defendant challenge the truthfulness of
factual statements made in a police affidavit supporting a search warrant.
18. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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may be effected on probable cause, it required an arrest warrant to arrest
a suspect in his home' 9 and a search warrant to arrest him in the home of
another.20 In Dunaway v. New York,2' the Court made it clear that detention
of a suspect for custodial questioning by the police must be justified by
probable cause, whether or not the police considered their act an "arrest."
In Dunaway and in Brown v. Illinois22 the Court would not allow Miranda
warnings alone to "purge the taint" of such an illegal arrest such that
a confession made by the arrestee could be used. Rather, the confession
must, on all the facts, be found to be an act of "free will." ' 23 Thus a possible
incentive to the police to perform illegal arrests in hopes of gaining an
incriminating statement from the suspect was largely dispelled.
Further, the Court limited the application of Terry v. Ohio 2 by forbidding
frisks of those present at premises that were being searched pursuant to a
search warrant, absent the individualized suspicion as to dangerousness re-
quired by Terry.21 In Delaware v. Prouse26 it similarly forbade random stops
of automobiles for drivers' license and registration checks. Finally, in Ger-
stein v. Pugh27 it forbade "extended" detention of an arrestee unless he is
brought before a judicial officer for a determination of probable cause.
In the interrogation area the Court's decisions have been similarly bal-
anced, not allowing Miranda v. Arizona2 to be expanded, but showing some
sensitivity to the rights of criminal suspects, even rights that were never
recognized until Miranda itself.
In the early seventies, it appeared that the Court, as Professor Stone
observed, 29 was paving the way to overrule Miranda. The Court allowed
statements obtained from a suspect in violation of Miranda to be used to
impeach him at trial, 30 and allowed requestioning by police even after the
defendant had asserted his right to silence.' It permitted the prosecution to
use evidence which was the "fruit" of an unwarned statement 2 and termed
19. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
20. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
21. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
22. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
23. Id. at 603-04. "[T]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence
of intervening circumstances and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official mis-
conduct are all relevant factors to be considered." Id.
24. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
25. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
26. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
27. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
28. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
29. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 123.
30. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). And in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975),
it even allowed the defendant to be impeached with statements given after he was warned and
asserted his right to silence, thus providing police with an incentive to ignore the assertion of
the Miranda rights.
31. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
32. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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the Miranda warnings merely "prophylactic standards" designed to protect
the constitutional right against self-incrimination rather than constitutional
rights themselves.33
On the other hand, while concluding that a suspect had not been subject
to interrogation in a police car when he told police where to find a murder
weapon, the Court extended Miranda to any custody (not just station house
custody) and defined "interrogation" rather broadly as including "any words
or actions on the part of the police [other than those normally attendant to
custody] that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.13 4 In Edwards v. Arizona" the Court distinguished
between assertion of the right to silence by a suspect and of right to counsel,
holding that after the latter assertion, interrogation must (really) cease until
counsel has been made available. No second tries by police will be permitted
unless the defendant "initiates" further conversation. 36 Also, in Estelle v.
Smith37 the Court held that a psychiatric interview (which led to testimony
against a defendant at the "death phase" of his murder trial) required a
Miranda warning and notification of counsel. Recently, in Berkemer v.
McCarty," the Court extended the Miranda requirement to all crimes, in-
cluding misdemeanor traffic offenses. The other significant pro-defendant
interrogation case, Brewer v. Williams,a9 did not involve Miranda at all but,
instead, resurrected the pre-Miranda decision in Massiah v. United States40
in holding that once adversary proceedings had begun against a defendant
the police could not "deliberately ... elicit" incriminating statements from
him in the absence of counsel. 4'
Recent cases have not all favored defendants. In New York v. Quarles42
the Court established a "public safety" exception to the requirement that
33. This, despite express language to the contrary in Miranda. Miranda held that the
warnings are required by the fifth amendment "unless we are shown other procedures which
are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their rights." 384 U.S. at 467. See also
id. at 476 ("The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect
to the Fifth Amendment privilege . . . ."). See generally Stone, supra note 29, at 118-19.
34. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
35. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
36. Id. at 484-85. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983), the Court held that
a suspect had "initiated ... conversation" with the authorities by asking, "what is going to
happen to me now?" See also Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490, 495 (1984) (holding that after
an Edwards request, the defendant's responses to further reading, or discussion of, the Miranda
warnings, "may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request
itself").
37. 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981).
38. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
39. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
40. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
41. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 1240. In Brewer the police appealed to the defendant's religious
feelings in urging him to lead them to the body of his victim so that she could have a "Christian
burial." See also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (extending Brewer to "deliberate
elicitation" of statements, not by police but by a fellow prisoner who was a police "plant").
But see Kuhlman v. Wilson, 54 U.S.L.W. 4809 (1986) (holding that a fellow prisoner who
merely hears and reports defendant's statements does not violate Massiah).
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the police give Miranda warnings. In Oregon v. Elstad43 it held that the
"fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" did not operate to exclude a second,
warned statement by a suspect that followed a prior unwarned one. Finally,
in Moran v. Burbine" it enforced a suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights,
despite the police's failure to tell him that a counsel retained for him by a
third party was attempting to reach him, and their assurance to his counsel
that he would not be interrogated.
In the third major area of pretrial rights, involving identification proce-
dures, the Burger Court, in Kirby v. Illinois,45 effectively gutted the 1967
requirement of United States v. Wade" that counsel must be present at a
lineup by limiting that holding to post-indictment lineups. Since most lineups
are for the purpose of finding out if the police have the right person, they
are, of necessity, pre-indictment.47
II. JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S VIEWS
In all but two of the cases discussed above, 4 Justice Rehnquist either
voted against the defendant, or, concurring in the result, expressed serious
reservations about a pro-defendant opinion (though, as will be discussed,
he has subsequently acceded to the majority view in many of these cases).
No other Justice approached him in maintaining such a consistent stance in
favor of the views advanced by law enforcement. Does this mean that
Rehnquist, admittedly the most conservative member of the Court, is ac-
curately termed an "extremist" who would, if he had the votes, return
criminal procedure law to its pre-Warren Court state? 49 Although I disagree
with many of his positions, my answer is "no."
42. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
43. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
44. 54 U.S.L.W. 4265 (1986).
45. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
46. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (holding that
right to counsel does not apply to photographic identifications whether conducted before or
after the filing of formal charges). See Kamisar in THE BURGER COURT, supra note I, at 68-
72, for a detailed criticism of the pretrial identification cases.
47. In fact, neither Wade nor Kirby represents the most sensible approach to lineups, which
is to require them to be either photographed and tape recorded or videotaped if they are to
be used in court. As anyone who has actually been to a lineup knows, there is nothing for
defense counsel to do there except to see if the procedure is unfairly suggestive of counsel's
client as the criminal, and complain about it later to the court. This can be better achieved by
recording the proceedings.
48. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
49. An interesting example of the impact of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), can be
found by consulting criminal law and procedure textbooks written just before Mapp was decided.
In one of the leading casebooks, PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS (2d ed. 1959), the author states, remarkably, that the fourth amendment "applies to
the federal government and is not a limitation upon the powers of the state." Id. at 860. Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which had held precisely the opposite ten years before, is
not mentioned. The failure of the Court in Wolf to apply the exclusionary rule (as opposed
to the fourth amendment itself) to the states meant that, as a practical matter, the amendment
had no impact. Indeed, it had so little impact that Perkins did not even realize it applied. See
[Vol. 62:273
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One measure of "extremism" is how often and to what extent a Justice
differs from the rest of the Court. Much has been made of the fact that
Justice Rehnquist has authored fifty-four sole dissents in his term on the
court.50 Fifty-four sole dissents out of some 2,100-2,200 decisions in which
he has participated in fifteen years is not an overwhelming statistic. More-
over, as I discuss, many of those sole dissents accept much of the majority's
opinion. More significant in assessing "extremism," or whether Justice Rehn-
quist is "a loner ... out at the edge of the Court" as Anthony Lewis
avers,5' is how frequently he disagrees with his colleagues. Over the last two
years for which statistics are available, Justice Rehnquist has dissented an
average (mean) of 31.5 times out of about 150 opinions-slightly less than
the average of 31.8 for the Court as a whole. In this respect he is far less
of a "loner" than Justices Brennan (58.5), Marshall (55.5) and Stevens
(52) .2
In assessing the substance of Justice Rehnquist's views of criminal pro-
cedure it is important to recognize those aspects of the Warren Court in-
novations with which he does not disagree. In my view the most significant
decisions by the Warren Court were Gideon v. Wainwright,53 extending the
sixth amendment right to counsel to state felony defendants, and Douglas
v. California 4 and Griffin v. Illinois5 according indigent defendants the
rights to counsel and a free transcript on appeal. Without counsel to represent
a defendant at trial and without the opportunity to bring an effective appeal,
other constitutional rights, such as that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
as well as pretrial rights, could be ignored. Justice Rehnquist has never
expressed any disagreement with these cases, 56 nor with other key cases that
ensure criminal defendants a fair trial in state and federal courts.5 7 Indeed,
Kamisar, infra note 102, at 71-72, for further evidence that, before Mapp, state and local
police ignored the fourth amendment but after Mapp they attempted to conform to it.
50. Nat'l L.J., supra note 6, at 48-49. (A follow-up article set the up-to-date total at 54.)
51. N.Y. Times, supra note 3.
52. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 99 HARV. L. REv. 322 (1985); The Supreme Court,
1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1984).
53. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
54. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
55. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
56. Justice Rehnquist did, however, author the majority opinion in Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600 (1974), limiting the right to counsel on appeal to the first appeal as of right and not
to subsequent discretionary appeals. See also Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985) (opinion
of Rehnquist, J., dissenting), arguing that there is no due process (as opposed to equal protec-
tion) right to counsel on appeal, but agreeing that "the States must provide an attorney to those
who can't afford one [on the first appeal as of right] .... ." Id. at 843.
57. These include Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (forbidding the prosecutor to
comment adversely on the defendant's failure to testify) and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968) (upholding the defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses, including co-defend-
ants). See also Tennessee v. Street, 105 S. Ct. 2708 (1985) (Justice Rehnquist joined a unanimous
opinion reaffirming Bruton but carving out a limited exception to it).
In Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 309 (1981), Justice Rehnquist did grumble about "the
mysterious process of transmogrification by which [the Fifth] Amendment was held to be
'incorporated' and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment" but his dissent
accedes to that development. He disagrees, rather,, with the Court's reading of Griffin to allow
a defendant to insist on a "no inferences from silence" instruction from the trial judge.
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he joined Justice Powell concurring in the result in Argersinger v. Hamlin"
which extended the right to counsel to misdemeanor cases. Powell and
Rehnquist agreed that an indigent should have appointed counsel at least
whenever he is entitled to a jury trial. "If there is no accompanying right
to counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless. ' 59 They would
have extended the right to counsel beyond jury trials to "whenever [it] is
necessary to assure a fair trial"' 6 but not necessarily to every case where the
defendant might be imprisoned, as the majority held. 6'
In his dissenting opinion in Taylor v. Louisiana,62 Justice Rehnquist further
explicated his basic agreement with the application of fundamental trial rights
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, quoting from Duncan v.
Louisiana 63
"The test for determining whether a right extended by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments with respect to federal criminal proceedings is also
protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment has been
phrased in a variety of ways in the opinions of this Court. The question
has been asked whether a right is among those 'fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions,' Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932); whether it is
'basic in our system of jurisprudence,' In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948); and whether it is 'a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial,'
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-344 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)....
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to
the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases .... ""
Justice Rehnquist described this as "a sturdy test."61 5 The cases cited in
the above passage from Duncan provided for right to counsel first in capital
(Powell) and then all felony (Gideon) cases, extended the fifth amendment
58. 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972). As Professor Israel has pointed out, the practical impact of
the Argersinger decision has been greater than Gideon. Not only are many more cases presented
at the misdemeanor level, but there also were many more states that had not been appointing
counsel in misdemeanor cases involving jail sentences prior to Argersinger than there were states
that had not been appointing counsel in felony cases before Gideon. Israel, supra note 5, at
1337-38.
59. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 46 (Powell, J., concurring in result).
60. Id. at 47.
61. In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979), the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, limited
Argersinger to cases where imprisonment is "actually imposed."
62. 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
63. 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
64. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 540-41 (emphasis Justice Rehnquist's).
65. Id. at 541. By "sturdy" Justice Rehnquist evidently meant both "good" and "not easy
to meet" since he continued that the Duncan tests were "not readily satisfied by every dis-
crepency between federal and state practice."
He then argued that the Court's holding that a male defendant was entitled to be tried by
a jury from the venire of which women were, in effect, excluded was not "necessary to guard
against oppressive or arbitrary law enforcement, or to prevent miscarriages of justice and to
assure fair trials." Id.
[Vol. 62:273
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right against self-incrimination to the states (Malloy), extended the sixth
amendment confrontation right to the states (Pointer) and forbade secret
criminal proceedings (Oliver).
Of course, the mere fact that Justice Rehnquist quoted this passage from
Duncan in a dissent does not necessarily mean that, if he had the votes, he
would not, for example, decide to overrule Malloy v. Hogan. However,
Justice Rehnquist has not been shy about expressing his disagreement with
key Warren Court decisions, even though he knew he lacked the votes to
change them. +6 Even if, when he came on the Court fifteen years ago, he
might have been inclined to overrule a case such as Malloy, it would be
truly extraordinary for him, after fifteen years of explicit acceptance of such
cases, to subsequently overrule them. In addition, he has recognized, as did
Chief Justice Burger, that in the years since he joined the Court the police
have learned to live with the Warren Court innovations and it would be
disruptive to now overrule them.67 Finally, he has stated that he considers
the Court's stance on criminal procedure issues to be "more even handed
now than it was when I came on the Court."' ' Accordingly, I shall assume
throughout this Article that, when Justice Rehnquist expresses acceptance
of a given doctrine, he means what he says.
In addition to acceptance of the fundamental precepts discussed above,
Justice Rehnquist has agreed that a state cannot compel a defendant to
stand trial in prison clothes69 and that a defendant cannot be prevented from
consulting with counsel during a recess in the trial.70 Similarly, he authored
the unanimous opinion in Burch v. Louisiana7' holding that the conviction
of a defendant for a non-petty offense by a non-unanimous six member jury
violates the defendant's right to trial by jury and joined New Jersey v.
Portash72 (despite a dissent by Justice Blackmun joined by the Chief Justice)
which held that testimony given before a grand jury under a grant of
immunity could not be used to impeach the defendant at trial. He also
66. He disagreed most notably with Mapp, 367 U.S. 643, in his dissent from denial of a
stay of the mandate of the Supreme Court of California in California v. Minjares, 443 U.S.
916 (1979), discussed infra, text accompanying note 99. See also United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264, 289 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (urging that Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964) be reexamined).
67. See infra text accompanying note 92.
68. Jenkins, The Partisan, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1985, (Magazine), at 34.
69. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). However, the majority further held that this
claim was negated by failure of counsel to object. Justices Brennan and Marshall disagreed
with this latter point.
70. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 688 (1984) (Justice Rehnquist agreed that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
should be available to defendants on federal habeas corpus).
71. 441 U.S. 130 (1979). To be sure, Burch merely stopped the progression of earlier cases
in which the jury trial rights of defendants had been constricted. See Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970)(six person jury constitutional); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)(Non-
unanimous guilty verdicts constitutional).
72. 440 U.S. 450 (1979). Justice Blackmun's dissent was based on jurisdictional grounds.
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INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
joined a unanimous opinion in Burks v. United States7 3 holding that double
jeopardy barred retrial of a defendant whose conviction had been reversed
by an appellate court based on insufficiency of evidence. He even joined
Justice Brennan's opinion in Goldberg v. United States74 taking a rather
expansive view of the defendant's right to receive the prosecutor's notes of
a witness interview under the Jencks Act despite the fact that four other
Justices expressed reservations about the scope of the opinion. 7
5
More recently, Justice Rehnquist further demonstrated his adherence to
the notion that the federal Constitution (and the federal courts) should
guarantee fundamental trial rights when he joined a unanimous Court in
Crane v. Kentucky, 76 reversing the Kentucky Supreme Court's holding. In
Crane, the Court held that a defendant at trial must be allowed to introduce
evidence as to the circumstances under which a confession was given in an
effort to show that the confession was unworthy of belief.
None of the above is designed to show that Justice Rehnquist is the
"defendant's pal" when it comes to trial rights. Indeed, many decisions
could be mustered to make the opposite case. Rather, the point is that he
is not a "knee jerk conservative," ready to vote against the defendant no
matter what the circumstances and unconcerned about the possibility of a
defendant not being allowed to make an adequate defense. Instead, the cases
just discussed show that he, like all of the other Justices, weighs the interests
of the state in convicting the guilty against the interests of the defendant
and is committed to reaching a conclusion that comports with his under-
standing of the Constitution.
In 1976, Professor Shapiro wrote an article about Justice Rehnquist in
which he averred that the three "basic propositions" that "guid[e] his votes"
are:
I. Conflicts between an individual and the government should,
whenever possible, be resolved against the individual;
2. Conflicts between state and federal authority ... should,
whenever possible, be resolved in favor of the states; and
3. Questions of the exercise of federal jurisdictions . . . should,
whenever possible, be resolved against such exercise. 7
73. 437 U.S. 1 (1978). See also Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981) (unanimous
opinion). But see Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982) (Justice Rehnquist joined a 5-4 opinion
which weakened Burks by holding that reversal of the defendant's conviction based on the
weight, rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence does not bar retrial, a distinction that I
find unconvincing).
74. 425 U.S. 94 (1976).
75. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred in the opinion but made it clear
that certain of the prosecutor's notes were exempt from disclosure. Id. at 112-16.
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, concurred in the result but disagreed with
the majority as to what prosecutorial notes were appropriate for disclosure. Id. at 116-29.
76. 106 S. Ct. 2142 (1986).
77. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REv. 293, 294 (1976).
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While these propositions are more likely than not to characterize Justice
Rehnquist's votes, they can hardly be considered a guiding philosophy to
which he adheres "whenever possible," at least in criminal procedure. To
cite but a few examples, in Burch v. Louisiana"8 he wrote the unanimous
opinion striking down a Louisiana constitutional provision that allowed non-
unanimous six-member jury verdicts. In Crane v. Kentucky,7 9 he voted to
reverse the Kentucky Supreme Court (and the defendant's conviction) on
sixth amendment grounds. In United States v. Yermian,8 0 he authored the
dissenting opinion, urging that the rule of lenity must be applied to reverse
a defendant's conviction under a federal false statement charge. In Smalis
v. Pennsylvania, ' he joined a unanimous Court in reversing the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and holding that double jeopardy barred a retrial after the
trial court granted the defendant's demurrer.
As Justice Rehnquist stated in his majority opinion in Illinois v. Gates.82
"Fidelity" to the commands of the Constitution suggests balanced judge-
ment rather than exhortation. The highest "fidelity" is achieved neither
by the judge who instinctively goes furthest in upholding even the most
bizarre claim of individual constitutional rights, any more than it is
achieved by a judge who instinctively goes furthest in accepting the most
restrictive claims of governmental authorities. The task of this Court, as
of other courts, is to "hold the balance true" and we think we have
done that in this case.
As to confession law, while Justice Rehnquist has rather consistently voted
not to expand the scope of Miranda v. Arizona83 and has also urged that
Massiah v. United States" be overruled85 it is nevertheless clear that he now
accepts the Miranda decision as well as certain of the key subsequent decisions
that give it added significance.
Early in his career on the Court, Justice Rehnquist seemed hostile to
Miranda. In 1974, he wrote the Court's opinion in Michigan v. Tucker
86
which, in deeming the Miranda warnings merely "prophylactic rules" rather
78. 441 U.S. 130.
79. 106 S. Ct. 2142.
80. 468 U.S. 63 (1984). See also Ball v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1668 (1985) (defendant
cannot be convicted for separate counts of receiving and possessing a firearm under federal
statutes); Dowling v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 3127 (1985) (Rehnquist voted to reverse a
defendant's conviction on the ground that the federal statute did not reach his conduct over
a dissent by Powell, Burger and White); Liparota v. United States, 53 U.S.L.W. 4530 (1985)
(joined Brennan opinion holding that, in order to convict for food stamp fraud, government
must show that the defendant knew the applicable regulations; White and Burger dissented).
81. 106 S. Ct. 1745 (1986).
82. 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983).
83. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
84. 377 U.S. 201.
85. Henry, 447 U.S. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Saltzburg, supra note 5,
at 206-08 (criticizing Massiah's "doctrinal emptiness").
86. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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than a constitutional right of the defendant,8 7 seemed, as Professor Stone
has observed, "certainly to have laid the groundwork to overrule Miranda. "81
Moreover, he dissented in Doyle v. Ohio8 9 when the majority held that a
defendant's post-warning silence could not be used against him. He agreed
with the majority in Oregon v. Haas9 that a defendant could be impeached
with statements made after he had asked for a lawyer and been wrongly
questioned further and joined a majority in Michigan v. Mosley9l holding
that a defendant who had asserted his right to silence could be questioned
later as to another offense.
However, whatever his initial reservations about Miranda, in recent years
he has accepted the decision. He has recognized that Miranda has "afforded
police and courts clear guidance on the manner in which to conduct a
custodial investigation: if it was rigid, it was also precise." 92 In Wainwright
v. Greenfield,9a concurring in the result, Justice Rehnquist "agree[d] ...
that our opinion in Doyle v. Ohio, . . . shields from comment by a prosecutor
a defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings, even though the
comment be addressed to the defendant's claim of insanity."94 In Edwards
v. Arizona9 he joined Justice Powell concurring in the result but agreeing
with the majority that Edwards's interrogation "clearly was questioning
under circumstances incompatible with a voluntary waiver of the fundamental
right to counsel." ' 96 Finally, in Berkemer v. McCarty,97 he joined, without
reservation, a Court opinion that applied Miranda to any custodial inter-
rogation "regardless of the nature or severity of the offense for which [the
defendant] is suspected or for which he was arrested" (but that "roadside
questioning" of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop does not constitute
"custodial interrogation").98
In the fourth amendment area, Justice Rehnquist has been much more
consistent in voting against defendants. This is because of his belief that
"the so-called 'exclusionary rule' created by this Court imposes a burden
87. Id. at 439.
88. Stone, supra note 29, at 123.
89. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
90. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
91. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
92. Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., Opinion in Chambers).
93. 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986).
94. Id. at 641. However, he disagreed that the defendant's request for counsel could not
be so used. While silence may be "insolubly ambiguous," as Doyle held, "a request for a
lawyer may be highly relevant where the plea is based on insanity." Id. at 642 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring, joined by Burger, C.J.).
95. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
96. Id. at 490. However, Powell and Rehnquist did not agree that a defendant could only
be further interrogated if he "initiated further conversation." Rather, the question should have
been "whether there was a free and knowing waiver of counsel before interrogation com-
menced." Id. at 491.
97. 468 U.S. 420.
98. Id. at 434, 442.
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out of all proportion to the Fourth Amendment values which it seeks to
advance."" This belief is shared by Chief Justice Burger,' ° as it was by
Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker who dissented in Mapp v. Ohio,'"'
and many others.'0 2
Given Justice Rehnquist's view that it is irrational to "let the criminal go
free because the constable blundered," it is not surprising that he is generally
inhospitable to claims of criminal defendants that their convictions should
be reversed because of the trial court's failure to suppress evidence that has
allegedly been illegally seized. Rehnquist believes that whatever the appro-
priate remedy, it includes neither the suppression of evidence at trial nor
the reversal of convictions for failure to suppress. 03 Having failed to convince
his colleagues that illegally seized evidence should not be excluded, he tends
to argue in each case that the evidence in question was not illegally seized.
Sometimes he is successful in the endeavor, as in United States v. Robinson"'4
where the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, held that a search incident to any
custodial arrest (even for a traffic offense) was appropriate as long as the
arrest was based on probable cause, even though there was no additional
justification for the search.' °5 Other times he fails, as in Ybarra v. Illinois'06
where a 6-3 majority held, over a dissent by Justice Rehnquist,107 that police,
99. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a fuller
exposition of Justice Rehnquist's opposition to the exclusionary rule, see California v. Minjares,
443 U.S. 916 (1977) (dissenting from denial of stay) (joined by Chief Justice Burger). At the
Senate hearings on his nomination as Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist, in response to a question
from Senator Specter, acknowledged that Mapp v. Ohio is "a well established" precedent, im-
plying that he no longer seeks to overrule it. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 2.
At least one of Justice Rehnquist's reasons for disfavoring the exclusionary rule, his belief
that "the United States is the only nation in the world in which the most relevant, most
competent evidence as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is mechanically excluded because
of the manner in which it may have been obtained," Minjares, 443 U.S. at 919, is wrong.
Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1032, 1033 (1983) ("German
law may require the exclusion from criminal prosecutions of otherwise relevant and competent
evidence solely because the use of such evidence would violate the constitutional rights of the
accused."). See also MacDougall, The Exclusionary Rule in Canada and its Alternatives-
Remedies for Constitutional Violations in Canada and the United States, 76 J. CuIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 608 (1985) (discussing the recently enacted Canadian constitutional rule based on
the American model).
100. See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U.L. REv. 1, 10 (1964).
101. 367 U.S. at 672.
102. See, e.g., Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDI-
CATURE 214 (1978), and sources cited therein. For the opposite position see, e.g., Kamisar, Is
the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?,
62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978), and sources cited therein.
103. See generally Minjares, 443 U.S. at 927.
104. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
105. Other significant opinions written by Justice Rehnquist which take a relatively narrow
view of what constitutes a fourth amendment violation are Gates, 462 U.S. 213, in which the
definition of "probable cause" is broadened, and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), in
which a "frisk" was allowed despite the fact that the policeman who performed it had seen
no illegal activity (he had been "tipped" by "a person known" to him).
106. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
107. Id. at 98. The dissenters argued that such a confrontation was so inherently dangerous
that individualized suspicion was not required.
19871
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
in executing a search warrant at a bar could not frisk the patrons found
therein without reasonable individualized suspicion that they were armed
and dangerous.
Another approach taken in the fourth amendment area by Justice Rehn-
quist and the more conservative Justices is to argue that, whether or not a
search was illegal, the defendant is foreclosed from raising the issue. The
most significant opinion by Justice Rehnquist in this regard is the majority
opinion in Rakas v. Illinois'0 8 in which the Court took a rather narrow view
of a defendant's standing to raise fourth amendment claims in holding that
a passenger of a car may not raise the issue of the illegality of the search
of that car. Similarly, in Stone v. Powell'°9 the Court per Justice Powell
held that fourth amendment claims could not be entertained on federal
habeas corpus. In United States v. Havens,"' a 5-4 majority per Justice
White allowed the government to use illegally seized evidence to impeach
the defendant's testimony, even as to matters first raised by the prosecutor
on cross-examination."' A related approach is, having failed in case A to
persuade a majority that a given police search was appropriate under the
fourth amendment, to argue in case B that case A is not retroactive. This
Justice Rehnquist did successfully in United States v. Peltier'2 in which the
Court held that Almeida-Sanchez v. United States' 3 was not retroactive."1
4
There are, however, limits to the police behavior that Justice Rehnquist
will countenance under the fourth amendment. In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New
York,115 Justice Rehnquist joined a unanimous Court in striking down an
open-ended search warrant and the participation of the judge who issued
the warrant in the search. In Brown v. Texas"6 he again joined a unanimous
Court in striking down a state statute that required people to identify them-
selves to the police. In Mincey v. Arizona' '7 he explicitly agreed with the
majority that there should be no murder scene exception to the fourth
108. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
109. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
110. 446 U.S. 620 (1980). Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) had previously held
that a defendant's direct testimony could be impeached with illegally seized evidence.
111. For a criticism of this holding, see Bradley, Havens, Jenkins and Salvucci, and the
Defendant's "Right" to Testify, 18 AM. CRam. L. REv. 415 (1981).
112. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
113. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Almeida-Sanchez held that warrantless roving patrol searches for
illegal aliens were unconstitutional.
114. Finally, even if the fourth amendment violation and defendant's capacity to raise it are
conceded, the Court may find the error harmless. However, while Justice Rehnquist has written
harmless error opinions in cases involving error at trial, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct.
1431 (1986), and in the grand jury, United States v. Mechanik, 106 S. Ct. 938 (1986), to date
the only case to find a fourth amendment violation harmless, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970), did so without discussion and before Justice Rehnquist joined the Court.
115. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
116. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). However, he joined Justice White in dissent in Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352 (1983), when the majority struck down a somewhat similar California statute.
117. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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amendment warrant requirement and that warrantless searches were generally
disfavored." 8 In the recent case of New York v. PJ Video ' 9 he recognized,
in writing the majority opinion, that "police may not rely on the 'exigency'
exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement in conducting a
seizure of allegedly obscene materials, under circumstances where such a
seizure would effectively constitute a 'prior restraint.' ",20 In Hayes v. Flor-
ida,'2' he joined a unanimous Court in reversing the Florida courts and
holding that in the absence of probable cause or consent, it was an uncon-
stitutional seizure for police to take a suspect to the station for fingerprinting
and the fingerprints must be suppressed. 22 In United States v. Place23 he
joined the majority in striking down the seizure of a drug courier's luggage
on the ground that the ninety-minute seizure of that luggage to await a
"dog-sniff" was an unreasonable seizure under Terry v. Ohio.124 Finally,
and most significantly, in Gerstein v. Pugh'25 he joined a unanimous Court
decision that required, under the fourth amendment, a judicial determination
of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on a suspect's liberty
following an arrest.
Some might argue, as did Senator Kennedy at Justice Rehnquist's con-
firmation hearing,'2 6 that merely joining a unanimous opinion does not count
for much since the result was "obvious" or there was no real dispute. I
disagree. In many of these cases the Court overruled the decision of a state
supreme court and in virtually all of them there was a substantial issue
which generated strong arguments on both sides. Had this not been so, the
Supreme Court would not have granted certiorari. 27 Certainly an extremist
could have found a colorable position to argue.
Three decisions of the Burger Court from which Justice Rehnquist dis-
118. Id. at 405. Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority opinion on the separate issue
of the admissibility of certain statements made by the defendant.
119. 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986). However, the majority refused to adopt a "higher" probable
cause standard for searches implicating first amendment issues. It was from this holding that
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens dissented. Id. at 1621.
120. Id. at 1614. Also, in Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983), Justice Rehnquist, consistently
with his view that there should be other remedies than evidentiary exclusion for fourth amend-
ment violations, joined a unanimous Court in allowing a defendant who plead guilty to pursue
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the police based on an alleged illegal search and seizure.
121. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
122. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred only in the result because the majority further
offered the dictum that on-site fingerprinting of the suspect would have been constitutional.
Hayes, 470 U.S. at 818-19.
123. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
124. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun concurred in the result
arguing that the Court should not have approved the "dog-sniff" in this case.
125. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). However, four Justices refused to join that portion of the Court's
opinion that held that the question of probable cause to hold the defendant can be determined
without an adversary hearing. Id. at 126 (Stewart, J., concurring).
126. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of Edward Kennedy, Senator).
127. See, e.g., R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 259 (5th ed. 1978)
(discussing why the Supreme Court grants certiorari).
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sented have been cited by Professor Kamisar as being of particular signifi-
cance in showing that the Court was not "bent on dismantling the criminal
justice revolution forged by its predecessor."'2 8 It might seem that, by siding
with the government in all of those cases Justice Rehnquist was "willing
and eager to dismantle the work of the Warren Court in the search and
seizure area" as Kamisar says of him. 29 While, as discussed, Justice Rehn-
quist has been, at least until recently, '" 0 bent on overruling Mapp v. Ohio,
still, an analysis of his opinions in these cases suggests that his views are
not so extreme as Kamisar suggests.
The three cases are Dunaway v. New York,'"' Delaware v. Prouse3 2 and
Franks v. Delaware.3 In Dunaway, the Court held that "picking up a
suspect for questioning" constituted an "arrest" which must be justified by
probable cause and that subsequent Miranda warnings could not alone be
considered to have "purged the taint" of such a non-probable cause arrest.
Rather, as Brown v. Illinois34 held, additional factors must be considered
to determine whether a confession is admissible in these circumstances. 3 5
Justice Rehnquist (joined by Chief Justice Burger) began his dissent by
agreeing with both of the aforestated holdings of the case:
If the Court did no more in this case than it announced in the opening
sentence of its opinion-"decide ... the question reserved ten years ago
in Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969), namely, 'the question of
the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a
full fledged arrest' "-I would have little difficulty joining its opin-
ion .... [The Court goes on to conclude that petitioner Dunaway was
in fact "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and that
the connection between Dunaway's purported detention and the evidence
obtained therefrom was not sufficiently attenuated as to dissipate the
taint of the alleged unlawful police conduct.... I cannot agree with
either conclusion, and accordingly, I dissent.1 16
As the dissent makes clear, Justice Rehnquist accepted the fundamental
innovation of Dunaway-that an involuntary seizure is an "arrest" regardless
of what the police call it, and also accepted the reaffirmation of Brown v.
128. THE BURGER COURT, supra note 1, at 81.
129. Id. at 82.
130. See Confirmation Hearings, supra note 2, concerning Rehnquist's statement at his
confirmation hearings.
131. 442 U.S. 200, 221 (1979). Kamisar discusses Dunaway along with Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590 (1975) and Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982). Since Dunaway is the only
one of these cases in which Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion, I have confined myself to a
discussion of that case.
132. 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979).
133. 438 U.S. 154, 180 (1978).
134. 422 U.S. 590.
135. Those factors are: the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence
of intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id. at
603.
136. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 221.
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Illinois'a7 that more than Miranda warnings were generally required to render
a confession admissible after such an illegal arrest. His disagreement was as
to whether, on the facts of this case, Dunaway's seizure was in fact invol-
untary and, again on the facts, whether the requirements of Brown for
purging the taint of the arrest had been met. As to the first point, he noted
that:
Petitioner was not told he was under arrest and was not warned not to
resist or flee. No weapons were displayed and petitioner was not hand-
cuffed. Each officer testified that petitioner was not touched or held
during the trip downtown; his freedom of action was not in any way
restrained by the police. In short, the police behavior in this case was
entirely free of "physical force or show of authority."'3 8
As to the second point, Justice Rehnquist noted that Miranda warnings
had been given to the defendant and that the police had acted in good faith
(i.e., their misconduct was not "purposeful or flagrant," factors the Brown
Court considered particularly significant). He advanced the view that when
the police made an illegal arrest in good faith, the giving of Miranda warnings
should be enough to purge the taint, a view that is arguably consistent with
the subsequent holding in United States v. Leon'39 establishing a "good faith
exception" to the exclusionary rule in the case of illegal, but warranted,
searches. Thus, his dissent in Dunaway shows acceptance, not rejection, of
the fundamental rules advanced by the Court and disagreement only as to
how broadly these rules should be applied.
In Prouse, Justice Rehnquist's dissent was even more limited than in
Dunaway. The majority held that automobiles may not be stopped by police
without "reasonable suspicion" of wrongful activity. However, they would
allow roadblocks to check all cars and drivers for proper driver's licenses
and registration.' 40
Justice Rehnquist began by chiding the majority for allowing all cars, but
not individual cars, to be stopped. "The Court thus elevates the adage
'misery loves company,' to a novel role in fourth amendment jurisprud-
ence.' 4' He then agreed with the majority as to the major holding of the
case: stops of cars to investigate criminal (as opposed to traffic) violations
cannot be made at random. 42 His only disagreement with the majority was
whether random stops, as opposed to roadblocks where all motorists are
stopped, are the best way to strike the balance between the motorist's interest
137. 422 U.S. 590. Justice Rehnquist had previously joined Justice PoweU concurring in part
in Brown, id. at 606, in which they agreed with the rule announced by the majority but disagreed
with its application to the facts presented in that case. Id. at 607.
138. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 223.
139. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
140. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
141. Id. at 664.
142. Id. at 665.
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in proceeding freely down the highway and the state's interest in discovering
traffic violations.1
43
The third case cited by Professor Kamisar is Franks v. Delaware.'4 In
that case the majority struck down a state rule that prevented a defendant
from challenging the truthfulness of police allegations in a search warrant
affidavit under any circumstances.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent (joined by Chief Justice Burger) reflects a subtle
balancing. While society has an interest in accurate affidavits, it also has
an interest in the finality of judgments, particularly judgments as to the
search and seizure issues which are collateral to the main issue of guilt or
innocence. While Justice Rehnquist concedes that an adversary hearing before
a judge is more likely to produce a valid judgment as to the accuracy of
the affidavit, he also correctly observes that even such an adversary deter-
mination will hardly be infallible.' 45 In his view, the additional light shed
on affidavits by allowing their factual accuracy to be litigated is not worth
the candle of what he foresees as a great increase in litigation, with its
attendant uncertainty and delay. 46
While I disagree with Justice Rehnquist's views in all three of these cases,
I think that a thoughtful person would have to concede that there is merit
in his arguments. While some may read an eagerness to "dismantle the work
of the Warren Court" between the lines of these dissents, such eagerness
certainly does not appear on their face. 47 What does appear is the thoughtful
exposition of a judge who, like the rest of the Court, is attempting to strike
the proper balance between the interests of the state in convicting the guilty
and of the individual in not being unfairly treated by the state.
The question is whether these appearances accurately reflect Justice Rehn-
quist's motives. The dissent in Franks is simply a further explication of his
frankly stated opposition to the exclusionary rule. If one disagrees with the
rule then one naturally wants to limit the defendant's ability to take ad-
vantage of it. The other two dissents are harder to understand. As noted,
they do not disagree with the major thrust of the majority's holdings. Rather,
they raise minor issues. Dunaway concerns the application of the facts to
the Court's rule (with which Rehnquist purportedly agrees) and Prouse
involves how to best discover traffic violations. If these expressed reasons
are really all that Justice Rehnquist disputes in the majority opinion, one
wonders why he bothered to dissent at all. One possible explanation might
143. Id. at 667. One might argue that if random "traffic" stops are allowed, police would
use this as a pretense to investigate other violations. However, no rule can effectively guard
against police prevarication. Under the majority's position, the police need merely aver that
the defendant was "driving erratically" in order to justify a stop.
144. 438 U.S. 154.
145. Id. at 186.
146. Id.
147. It is true, of course, that it means little to accept a liberal rule if one will not then
agree that any particular defendant's case is covered by the rule. However, I can see little
reason for Justice Rehnquist to accept the rules in these cases if he was not prepared to apply
them to some significant class of defendants.
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be that these narrow dissents are strategic; not wanting to give the defendant
anything, Justice Rehnquist chose a narrow ground of argument in hopes
of attracting a majority to his position. If this narrow ground, for example,
"no involuntary detention" in Dunaway, became precedent, it would make
it difficult for a defendant to take advantage of the more liberal rules which
would only come into play once it was determined that an involuntary
detention had occurred. Thus, arguably, Rehnquist's position in Dunaway
is essentially a "standing" argument which seeks to disqualify substantial
classes of litigants from the benefits of a holding that he purports to accept but
in fact dislikes. Similarly, in Prouse, one might construe Justice Rehnquist's
dissent as a veiled endorsement of random stops of motorists for all purposes
(including criminal investigations) rather than simply traffic investigations
as he purported since, if police can stop cars at random for traffic violations
then there is no real check on their ability to stop them for any purpose.
Indeed, his "misery loves company" argument ignores the attempt of the
majority to prevent that kind of abuse since roadblocks where driver's licenses
are checked are not, unlike random stops, likely to be a cover for criminal
investigations.
Whether Justice Rehnquist's motive in these cases was simply to raise the
narrow points he made or to advance a deeper, more strongly pro-law
enforcement purpose, cannot be discerned from reading the cases. One hopes
that when he becomes Chief Justice he, like Hughes, will forbear from
dissenting in as many cases' 48 and, when he does dissent, one can be confident
that an important principle is at stake.
Justice Rehnquist clearly recognizes that too much power in the hands of
the police can be dangerous. In general, however, his fourth amendment
jurisprudence has been informed by the view that the Warren Court went
too far in the other direction, according the criminal defendant too many
rights and allowing the crime problem to threaten the civil liberty of the
people. In a speech at the University of Kansas 49 he observed that:
No thinking person would suggest that we are precisely where we want
to be in the process of balancing claims for privacy against other govern-
mental interest or that every new claim of privacy should be rejected
simply because it might marginally impair the efficiency of law enforce-
ment. In Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, there was very efficient
law enforcement, there was very little privacy, and the winds of freedom
did not blow.'"
However, he also noted that:
If the claim to privacy may be idealized in terms of individual human
148. Chief Justice Hughes is discussed infra notes 159 and 161 and accompanying text.
149. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent With Fair and Effective Law
Enforcement, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 1 (1974).
150. Id. at 21. In that same speech, Justice Rehnquist noted his agreement with Menard v.
Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974) in which the court ordered the expungement of the
arrest record of a suspect who had been wrongly arrested and never charged from the FBI's
criminal (but not identification) files. Id. at 6-8.
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dignity, the claim of fair and efficient administration of the law may be
idealized in terms of the sine qua non of a self-governing society. To
the extent that a society is unable to enforce the laws it has enacted, it
is not a self-governing society. Nor is it a society in which civil liberties
and privacy are secure.'5 '
The "constitutionality of a particular search" in Justice Rehnquist's opinion,
"is a question of reasonableness and depends on 'a balance between the
public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers.' 152 Given Justice Rehnquist's view
of the exclusionary rule and his view that the Warren Court had gone
overboard in guaranteeing the rights of criminal defendants,'53 it is not
surprising that he has consistently endeavored to cut back on those rights.
However, as illustrated above, he has his limits.
III. REHNQUIST AS CHIEF JUSTICE
Heretofore the discussion has centered on Rehnquist's views as an Associate
Justice. However, there is reason to believe that he may moderate some of
the views expressed heretofore in an effort to lead the Court as the Chief
Justice. In the first place, he considers the "law dealing with the constitu-
tional rights of criminal defendants ... more evenhanded now than it was
when I came on the Court."' 5 4 Obviously, then, the sense of mission that
he had when he joined the Court, to "call[] a halt to a number of the
sweeping rulings of the Warren Court""' in the criminal procedure area has
now been fulfilled. He now recognizes that "there probably are things to
be said on both sides of issues that perhaps I didn't think there were"' 5
when he came on the Court in 1972.
He views one's "major contribution" on the Court as "putting something
together yourself or joining something someone else puts together that com-
mands a Court opinion."' 5 7 In a speech entitled "Chief Justices I Never
Knew" 5 8 he described the role of the Chief Justice:
Although his vote carries no more weight than that of his colleagues,
the chief justice undoubtedly influences the Court and its decisions. When
a new chief accedes to the bench, newspaper editorials often suggest that
by either his "executive" or his "administrative" ability he will somehow
"bring the Court together" and eliminate the squabbling and bickering
151. Id. at 22.
152. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 406 (Rehnquist, J.) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
153. In an interview with the New York Times Magazine he expressed the view that: "[A]t
the time I came on the Court the boat was kind of keeling over in one direction .... I felt
that my job was ... to kind of lean the other way." N.Y. Times, supra note 68, at 35.
154. Id. at 34.
155. Id. at 35.
156. Id. at 31.
157. Id. at 101.
158. Rehnquist, Chief Justices I Never Knew, 3 HASINGS CONST. L. Q. 637 (1976).
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thought to be reflected in decisions of important issues by a sharply
divided Court. The power to calm such naturally troubled waters is
usually beyond the capacity of any mortal chief justice. He presides over
a conference not of eight subordinates, whom he may direct or instruct,
but of eight associates who, like him, have tenure during good behavior,
and who are as independent as hogs on ice. He may at most persuade
or cajole them." 9
To the extent that Justice Rehnquist's positions have been extreme com-
pared to those of the other Justices, it is reasonable to expect that he will
moderate them. It is one thing to be a maverick '6° as an Associate Justice,
quite another to be one as Chief. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist has endorsed
Hughes' practice as Chief Justice of modifying his opinions in order to
attract additional votes:
Hughes believed that unanimity of decision contributed to public con-
fidence in the Court.... Except in cases involving matters of high
principle, he willingly acquiesced in silence rather than expose his dis-
senting views. In such cases he thought it was better to have the law
settled one way or another than to express his own position in a dissenting
opinion.
Hughes was also willing to modify his own opinions to hold or increase
his majority and if that meant that he had to put in disconnected thoughts
or sentences, in they went.'
6
'
This is not to say, as Justice Rehnquist discussed above, that he will cause
the Court to suddenly become harmonious and produce unanimous decisions.
It does mean that, rather like Anna and the King of Siam, in the process
of "cajoling" the people he may cajole himself as well.
159. Id. at 637. Justice Rehnquist also described how he believed the Chief should run the
conference:
By virtue of his own preparation and economy of statement, Charles Evans
Hughes presided magisterially and yet without offending the brethren. Stone, on
the other hand, though an extraordinarily able lawyer and excellent writer of
opinions, had less sensitivity for the different kinds of responsibilities associated
with presiding over the conference. If the chief justice conceives his role to be
akin to that of the presiding officer at a political convention, who can always
grab the microphone away from the opposition when necessary, he will create
resentment without actually advancing the cause that he champions. Justice Car-
dozo has written that "the sovereign virtue for the judge is clearness," and most
members of the profession would agree with him. The chief justice has a notable
advantage over his brethren: he states the case first, and analyzes the law governing
it first. If he cannot, with this advantage, maximize the impact of his views,
subsequent interruptions of colleagues or digressions on his part or by others will
not succeed either. Theodore Roosevelt described the presidency as a "bully
pulpit." The chief justice, as president of the conference, occupies no such
position.
Id. at 647 (footnote omitted).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
161. D. DANELESKI & J. TULCHIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EvANs HUGHES
at xxvi (1973). In his article Chief Justices I Never Knew, supra note 158, at 643, Justice
Rehnquist quoted a passage from another book on Hughes that said virtually the same thing
as the second paragraph quoted above.
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CONCLUSION
A consistent theme can be found throughout Justice Rehnquist's criminal
procedure decisions: a strong (some would say "blind") trust in the adver-
sary jury trial as the vehicle of criminal justice. He supports a rather ex-
pansive right to counsel and is generally supportive of the Warren Court
decisions in the trial rights area.
One of the reasons he does not support the exclusionary rule is that it
deprives the adversary process of relevant, possibly critical, evidence.' 62 In
the area of pretrial rights, he believes that the "reasonableness" of a search,
rather than the police's ability to discern and follow confusing court-created
rules, should be the cornerstone inquiry under the fourth amendment.' 63 Yet,
despite his feeling that the Warren Court had tilted the balance too far in
favor of criminal defendants, he has been willing to accede in most of the
criminal procedure decisions of that Court and to strike down police conduct
under the fourth and fifth amendments when, in his view, it ran afoul of
those holdings.
While readers of this article may have been surprised to find that Justice
Rehnquist has voted for criminal defendants as often as he has, nothing
presented here will convince Rehnquist's liberal opponents that he is not an
extremist who would dismantle the structure of criminal procedure protec-
tions if he had the votes to do so. Ultimately, I suppose, the conclusion
that he would not stems from knowledge of the man himself. In the context
of current law, where "conscience shocking"' abuses of rights by the police
are rare, Justice Rehnquist has voted against defendants' claims with relative
consistency. However, I, at least, am confident that he has no desire to
return to a system where the police are encouraged or allowed to violate
constitutional rights of criminal suspects with impunity. If the public concern
about the seriousness of the crime (particularly drug) problem increases, as
it seems to be doing, '6 political pressure may result in a renaissance of harsh
and intrusive law enforcement practices reminiscent of the years before the
Warren Court. In such a climate-, appointees to the federal bench might be
even more conservative than they have in the past. While, even in such a
harsh regime, Justice Rehnquist will never be enthusiastic about reversing
criminal convictions, he also will have the strength to uphold the core
protections of the Constitution against official invasion.
162. California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 919 (1977).
163. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 520 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). ("Analyzed
simply in terms of its 'reasonableness,' as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment, the
conduct of the investigating officers toward Royer would pass muster with virtually all thought-
ful, civilized persons not overly steeped in the mysteries of this Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence").
164. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
165. For example, a recent CBS poll found that 75% of the population favored harsher
penalties for drug offenses. 48 Hours on "Crack" Street (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 2,
1986).
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